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On the necessity for high-availability data center backends in a distributed
wireless system
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Abstract
When business processes depend on the processing
capabilities within a data center, the typical system
architecture use a high-availability setup to maintain a
high level of service. Faced with a specific machine-tomachine system consisting of many endpoints that
collect and forward data to the data center we argue
that the dependability of the overall system does not
necessitate a high level of service for the data center
components. Taking an existing discrete event
simulation model of a distributed technical system we
investigate and discuss the effects of prolonged outages
of the data center on the major business processes of
the system.
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1. Introduction
The value chain [1] perspective emphasizes those
activities that contribute directly to the product and the
firms’ profit. Beyond these primary activities a
sizeable number of support activities contribute
indirectly. However, one support activity – the day-today operations of the information systems – is de facto
already part of every primary activity: Business
processes need information and information systems to
run efficiently and to sustain a competitive advantage
[2].
In a software-intensive world business processes
depend – in the sense of [3] – on the information
processing where dependability has five major
attributes: availability, reliability, safety, integrity and
maintainability. In this article we focus on two
attributes, availability and reliability, to discuss their
effects on the architecture of information systems.
The starting point for our investigation is an
existing distributed machine-to-machine system, the
German automatic toll system. This system collects the
tolls from heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) driving on
federal toll roads in Germany (for more details see e.g.
[4] and references therein). About 90% of the tolls are
collected automatically by the more than 950000 onboard-units deployed in the HGVs (upper part in figure
1), for the remainder the users choose either a manual

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41926
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND

geo data

toll data

internet logon server

Central
System

Figure 1: High-level architecture of the toll
system with a fully automatic mode using
OBUs and a manual log-on via internet or toll
station terminals
log-on at a toll station terminal or the internet log-on to
pay the tolls for a planned route in advance. The toll
system collects a total of ~ 4.4 bn € annually [5] and is
an example for a liability-critical system, i.e. errors
may directly result in financial damages.
In the next section we describe the typical steps
undertaken to achieve a high level of service –
predominantly in the backend systems. Section 3 takes
the point of view of the end-to-end processing in the
case of the automatic toll collection. We argue that the
machine-to-machine system can leverage the
distributed clients, i.e. the OBUs in the toll system
example, to achieve dependability. To that extent
section 4 describes a sequence of simulation runs
where the backend systems are offline for increasing
periods of time. During the offline period the OBUs
buffer the data and start transmitting once the backend
systems become available. The accuracy of the
simulation results depends (among other things) on the
statistics used in modeling the user behavior. Section 5
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discusses these statistics and compares the simulation
model with observations from the real-world system.

2. Achieving a high level of service
The main purpose of a software-intensive system is
to render a service – either for a person or to another
technical system. In the generic terms of [3] the service
is the systems’ behavior as perceived by the users in
terms of what the system is intended to do. This
definition allows for a degree of recursiveness: Figure
1 could be read as showing a single system, i.e. the
high-level architecture of the German toll system, or
many loosely connected systems interacting with each
other.
These opposite views of what constitutes a ‘system’
lead to different conclusions when discussing nonfunctional requirements [6], e.g. expressed as
constraints (e.g. regarding the interfaces, performance,
operations, life-cycle or software economics [7]): Who
or what depends on the correct functioning of the
system? The generic answer should include a specific
requirement, e.g. concerning the quality of the service
[8]. Looking back at [3] the quality of the service could
be described amongst others in the terms of availability
and reliability:
 Is the service supposedly rendered by the system
available?
 Does the system provide the correct service
continuously?
The latter question is the topic of section 4.2 where
we discuss the quality attributes reliability and integrity
for the period of resuming normal operations after a
prolonged unavailability of the central system. The
answer to the first question is usually given as a metric
measuring the availability of the service. However, the
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Figure 2: Stylized layer model of two
application stacks A and B rendering a
service at a given quality.

metric depends on the point-of-view: If the system is
seen as a system-of-systems, i.e. each block in figure 1
constitutes a separate system; the availability is defined
and measured for each system on its own. This
approach readily leads to very high demands on the
availability of systems. An example is given in figure 2
where two systems A and B follow the same
architecture using a (simplified) layer model. When
application B is seen as rendering a service for
application A, the availability should be measured at
the application-level of system B.
A simple assumption for the availability of an
application stack as depicted in figure 2 is the “and”
combination of the component availabilities: The
hardware with its data center surroundings must be
operational, the operating system the data persistence
layer and the application itself running to render the
service of a single system. One consequence could be
to raise the availability of each component: The data
center can be built without single-point-of-failures, e.g.
up to multiple active power and cooling paths in a
Tier-IV data center [9], [10] yielding a site availability
of > 99.99%, server and storage hardware with internal
error detection and recovery and support staff on-site
around the clock. Increasing the availability even
further requires the duplication of the system under
consideration. When a fault occurs either in the soft- or
hardware the system switches to the replica and
continues operating. In that way many (but not all)
faults can be hidden [11] – increasing the time-tofailure and reducing the time-to-repair.
Increasing the requirements for the availability of
each system the cost of operations shows a
disproportionate increase. Over the past decade novel
IS operators started to offer cloud computing where
some functionality partakes in existing very large
installations with massive redundancy (e.g. [12]).
Looking at the toll system example at least some
systems offer themselves for a cloud solution, e.g. the
internet log-on system or the systems receiving the toll
data and providing updates to the OBU fleet. Other
systems, e.g. the large-scale billing application, might
not yet be ready to transition to a cloud provider – with
availability and business continuity listed as a primary
obstacle [13].
Returning to the toll system example from figure 1
the emphasis on the availability of sub-systems is at
least in parts misleading: These systems are either
sourced from business partners or physically deployed
in the HGVs. Therefore the next section shifts the
focus to discuss availability along the complete
business process of collecting tolls.

6294

OBU

generate
toll events

central system

calculate
tolls

~ minutes

transmit toll
data

store toll
data persistently

10s of seconds

create toll
data
records

billing

monthly billing cycle

Figure 3: The value chain of the automatic toll system and the typical time scales of automatic
processes. The simulation model includes an abstraction of the OBU processes, the data
transmission and the servers receiving and storing the toll data.

3. End-to-end processing
Looking at the toll system as a single system
rendering the service of collecting the tolls due for
driving on German federal toll roads the attribute
availability could be defined for the end-to-end
processing of the tolls. This perspective takes a large
part of the value chain (see figure 3) – generating toll
data through the use of OBUs, transmission of toll data
to the centrals system and download of updates to the
OBUs – to define the service rendered to the user, i.e.
the HGVs' driver. Apart from power-cycling the OBUs
the automatic toll system does not require user
interaction, i.e. it is a machine-to-machine system. In
that respect we suggest to use the metric POFOD
(probability of failure on demand), the proportion of
the overall fleet where OBUs are no longer able to
generate new toll data. When this happens the OBU
signals its unavailability to the user and the user is
required to participate in the manual or internet log-on
instead. Different reasons can trigger this situation:
The local storage space is exhausted, domain-specific
limitations are reached (e.g. the maximum time period
without successful communication or the credit
implied by the stored toll data). These triggers depend
only on the usage of a specific OBU – in that sense
there is no fleet-wide failure mode, the highavailability is inherent in the usage of independent
OBUs. Of course, the possibility of system-wide
software faults exists and must be addressed by other
means.
As long as the sub-systems are loosely coupled, the
components can hide periods of unavailability: Neither
the billing process nor the update process is required to
run in real-time (for the typical time scales see figure 3,
lower part). Similar to telco operations, the billing

cycle typically operates on a monthly basis, updates of
geo and map data take days to weeks to propagate
across the OBU fleet. Toll data is of course generated
in direct proportion to the HGV driving at a time scale
of seconds or minutes – as toll events while on a toll
road in the case of a thick-client OBU or as positional
data for subsequent processing in the central system in
the case of a thin-client OBU.
Following this approach the metric for the systems'
availability is the proportion of the OBUs that are
powered on and signal ‘out-of-service’ to the driver.
Anything leading up to this unavailability corresponds
at most to delayed processing – toll data needs more
time to arrive in the data center and is therefore
included only on future bills. It has to be assumed that
the operator of the toll system is required to finance the
delayed processing, i.e. the typical amount of tolls
needs to be transferred to the German federal
government in time and can only be recovered from the
users when the billing process has caught up with the
data backlog. In addition to the cost of financing the
operator is assumed to bear the risk of default on the
side of its users, i.e. over time some users become
unable to pay past tolls.

4. Simulation setup and results
To investigate the attribute availability from an
end-to-end perspective we use an existing realistic
discrete event simulation model of the German
automatic toll system [14]. To measure the POFOD
metric we enhance the OBU logic in the simulation
model to include different triggers for the OBU to
signal its unavailability. The most important trigger is
the exhaustion of the storage space reserved for toll
data – a fleet-wide parameter that we discuss in section
4.1 in more detail. Another trigger in a thick-client
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Figure 4: The simulation runs include an
offline period of the toll data server with a
duration of 1 to 10 consecutive days.
OBU is the validity of the OBUs' geo and map data. In
this article we assume that the server providing updates
remains available at all times and as a consequence the
validity of the local data is a negligible trigger for
OBUs to be out-of-service. However, at the end of a
fleet-wide update when the new map and geo data
becomes valid, those OBUs that were unable to fetch
the update in advance will be out-of-service until the
update is successfully downloaded and applied.
In addition to the OBU-logic we added the data
mining capabilities to the simulation model to measure
the fleet-wide percentage of OBUs that are out-ofservice in two different ways:
 Counting all OBUs even when they are powered
off or not within the reach of the German mobile
data networks or
 taking only the active OBUs (powered-on and in
Germany) into account.
The latter is close to the POFOD metric, i.e. it is the
percentage of OBUs signaling the driver that the OBU
is out-of-service. While the driver will perceive this as
outage, the real metric would be lower since HGVs
spend only ~ 50% of their driving time on toll roads.
The users’ perspective expressed with the POFOD
metric is an emergent property of the whole sociotechnical system: “[…] that which cannot be predicted
through analysis at any level simpler than that of the
system as a whole” [15]. To investigate the effects of
server outages on the automatic toll collection we set
up a series of simulation runs (see figure 4) where the
server receiving toll data is unreachable for 1 to 10
days consecutively starting with the Saturday at the
end of the third week in the simulation run. The –
seemingly arbitrary – choice of 10 days is motivated by
an outage starting on a weekend and running into a
week with public holidays (e.g. on Friday and Monday
on a Easter weekend in Germany) where the access to
personnel would typically be restricted.
Simulation runs for this scenario are repeated for
different sizes of the buffer allotted on the OBUs for
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Figure 5: The toll data buffered by the OBUs
increases proportionally over time while the
receiving toll data server is offline. Choosing
a small buffer size leads to an exhaustion
(blue line), a larger buffer (red, green) is
sufficient for this example.
storing toll data. The simulation runs include another
two weeks after the service is restored to observe the
return to normal operations. In any other respect we
use the existing realistic simulation model without
alteration: The size of the OBU fleet is 900 000, OBUs
lose their network connectivity briefly and frequently,
resource restrictions apply as in the real-world system.
Besides the server receiving the toll data no other
component has any outages in the simulation run.

4.1 Mitigating outages
Under normal operating conditions the OBUs are
far from signaling ‘out-of-service’: Toll data is
buffered and there is ample space and time available to
hide brief technical outages, e.g. of the mobile data
network or the backend system. Map and geo data is
distributed in advance so that only those few OBUs
that were offline for several weeks need to fetch an
update immediately after powering on or returning to
Germany. In this scenario OBUs buffer only enough
data to allow for efficient technical processes, e.g.
considering the server load in the central system and
the network characteristics. In effect the buffer holds
only a small amount of data under normal operating
conditions (normalized as 1 in figure 5).
With the onset of the 10-day period of the toll data
server unavailability toll data can no longer be sent
from the OBUs to the central system. Over time the
OBUs buffer the toll data generated while driving on
toll roads (see figure 5), the total amount of toll data
buffered increases linearly over time with different
rates on weekdays and weekends. Of course, once the
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Figure 6: Percentage of OBUs whose toll
data buffer is exhausted. 6 simulation results
for buffer sizes differing by a factor of 4 are
shown.
buffer on a given OBU is exhausted, it can no longer
participate in the automatic toll system: In figure 5 the
blue line gives the results for a simulation setup where
the buffer size is insufficient for long outages. In
comparison to buffer size twice or four times as large
the total amount of toll data buffered across the whole
fleet starts to drop off after five days while the number
of OBUs signaling a full buffer increases (not shown in
figure 5). At that time some of the most active HGVs
covered so many kilometers on toll roads that the
buffer is completely full. As time progresses more and
more HGVs reach this level. Doubling the buffer size
is already sufficient in our scenarios to ensure that
almost all OBUs remain in-service over the 10-day
offline period.
Taking the users’ point-of-view it is important to
note that the driving patterns of individual HGVs differ
drastically. Almost 10% are either powered off or
outside of Germany over long periods of time –
buffering toll data is obviously not a concern for these
OBUs. Considering the active HGVs the activity
follows of course a strong daily and weekly pattern
(see e.g. [4]). To determine the buffer size needed to
mitigate a given duration of server unavailability we
depend on the total amount of toll data gathered by a
given OBU over time. The example uses a 10-day
period (including two weekends and two days of public
holidays) to be buffered by the OBUs – most OBUs
cope easily with the outage even when using a small
buffer (as shown in figure 5). The most active users
quickly exhaust the available buffer space in the first
simulation scenario (relative buffer size “1” in figure
6) leading to a sizable portion of the OBU fleet being
out-of-service after the 10-day offline-period. It is
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Figure 7: CDF of the toll data collected per
OBU over one week as used in the
simulation (red line) compared to the realworld driving patterns (blue line).
interesting to note the “saturation” of the buffer across
the OBU fleet: The second Monday, i.e. the final day
of the offline period, leads to a sudden increase of
OBUs out-of-service by about 4 percentage points –
the ‘average’ driving patterns apparently begin to
exhaust the buffer after 9 days.
Increasing the buffer size on the OBUs quickly
improves the simulation results (see figure 6). Even a
20% increase in buffer size almost halves the number
of OBUs out-of-service after 10 days. Quadrupling the
buffer size suffices for almost all driving patterns. Yet
some OBUs are very active on toll roads and will still
exhaust the buffer. To pinpoint this behavior we look
at the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the
amount of toll data generated by an OBU over one
week (figure 7, the x-axis gives the toll data in
arbitrary units). Over the course of a week most HGVs
drive only a moderate distance on toll roads (the
median in figure 7 is close to „1“). However, some
HGVs are considerably more active – the CDF is
shown up to “5” units of toll data collected and still
includes only 99,18% of the OBUs in the real-world or
99,38% in the simulation.
Comparing the weekly HGV activity as generated
in the driving patterns simulation model (red line,
figure 7) with the real-world data (blue line) we note
that the driving patterns used in the simulation run
deviate noticeably: In reality HGVs generate less toll
data than in the simulation. In that way the simulation
paints a pessimistic picture of the percentage of OBUs
exhausting their buffer space. However, future work is
needed to improve the match between the simulated
and real-world driving patterns.
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4.2 resuming operations
When the server receiving the toll data resumes
operation, in our example in the night between Monday
and Tuesday after being offline for 10 days, the OBUs
quickly reconnect and transmit the buffered toll data.
Depending on the retry-mechanism OBUs try to reach
the central system periodically with a decreasing
frequency so as to avoid any overload situation due to
retries. Within the first hours after the toll data server
resumes operations most OBUs have completely
transmitted their buffered toll data (see the quick falloff in figures 5 and 6) – if the OBU is powered on and
within Germany. Looking at the overall amount of toll
data residing on the OBU fleet (figure 5) even several
days later almost 5 times as many toll data remain
throughout the OBU fleet than prior to the offline
period. In turn the risk of losing toll data (e.g. if the
OBU is destroyed or the HGVs owner files for
bankruptcy) is proportionally higher. The cost of
delayed processing is therefore at least the sum of
financing the delay and writing off unrecoverable tolls.
All simulation runs show that the server load at the
toll data server remains similar to normal operating
conditions even when more toll data is transmitted. To
gauge the sensitivity of the simulation runs to the
server capacity we added one additional scenario
where the number of parallel connections is limited to
1/3 of the typical daily peak load. Even then the offpeak hours suffice to return to normal operations with
only marginal side-effects.
This work emphasizes the availability of an
automatic system and we have shown that end-to-end
availability can be assured even if some parts are
offline for considerable periods of time. However, one
aspect should not be forgotten: [3] mentions reliability
as one aspect, i.e. the “continuity of correct service” –
in our case the overall detection quota (typically on a
level close to 99.9% [17]). Even when we have shown,
that the service can resume with almost no impact on
users – it did in all scenarios put the OBUs of at least
the most active HGVs out-of-service. While these
users are still able to log-on manually, the question is
open, at what level of impact the system can still be
considered to render a “correct service”.

5. Limitations
Dealing with simulations and statistics is in itself a
limitation – neither part is perfect and it may not be
possible to verify the model with real-world data.

Returning to the CDF of the weekly HGV activity we
ask whether there is a chance to encounter ‘black
swan’ statistics [16]? In some systems – most notably
safety-critical systems – even a single extreme event
must be considered. In our example the impact on a
single user is at most the need to switch to manual logon or the loss of toll data. What could be the statistical
outliers in our case? 0.8% of the OBUs collect more
tolls in a week than the maximum value shown in
figure 6. This compares to 0.6% as generated by the
model of the user behavior used in the simulation runs.
In both cases the most active OBUs create about twice
as much data as chosen as cut-off in figure 6. Even
with the largest buffer used in our simulation runs
about 1 in 500 OBUs will be out-of-service as it fills its
buffer completely.
The knowledge on the real-world statistics is
limited to an analysis of a time period of several
months since any older data is and must be deleted.
Looking at the maximum daily toll generated by OBUs
we see that OBUs can be much more active: A single
day suffices to reach well beyond the median of the
weekly activity seen in the OBU fleet. If this behavior
became the norm even the largest buffer used in our
scenarios would fill up within days.

6. Summary
Availability – one of the aspects making up a
dependable system – is usually defined in terms of subsystems, e.g. a server or a network connection. Taking
the example of the automatic German toll system we
argue that availability in a machine-to-machine system
should be defined end-to-end rather than at the
component level. Using an existing simulation model
we showed that a prolonged offline-period of a server
can be mitigated through local buffering of toll data.
Looking at the underlying statistical data we note that
the generated data differs from the real-world
observations, the simulation includes too many highly
active OBUs.
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